债务约束、管理层过度自信与投资效率
Debt constraints, management overconfidence and investment efficiency
投稿时间:2020-04-25  修订日期:2020-05-22
DOI:
中文关键词:  债务约束  管理层过度自信  投资效率
英文关键词:debt constraints  management overconfidence  investment efficiency
基金项目:安徽省人文社科重点项目“老工业基地富余员工“双创”瓶颈研究——以蚌埠市为例”(SK2018A0991)
作者单位E-mail
高淑娟 安徽财经大学商学院 1966293766@qq.com 
胡晓平 安徽财经大学商学院  
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中文摘要:
      该文从行为金融学理论出发,以2014-2018年A股上市公司为研究对象,研究管理层过度自信和债务约束各自对投资效率的影响,并进一步分析两者共同对投资效率发挥的作用。研究发现,管理层过度自信程度越高,企业的投资效率越低;企业的债务约束强度越大,对投资效率的削弱作用越明显;在债务约束程度不断增强时,管理层过度自信对投资效率的反向作用得到抑制,反应债权人对管理层发挥一定的外部监管作用。文章中的研究为企业及相关监管部门提供一定的借鉴。
英文摘要:
      Based on the theory of behavioral finance, this article takes A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2018 as the research object, studies the impact of management overconfidence and debt constraints on investment efficiency, and further analyzes the role of both of them in investment efficiency. The study found that the higher the degree of management overconfidence, the lower the investment efficiency of the company; the greater the intensity of corporate debt constraints, the more obvious the effect of weakening investment efficiency; when the degree of debt constraints continues to increase, the overconfidence of management on investment efficiency The reverse effect of this was suppressed, reflecting that creditors played a certain external regulatory role on management. The research in the article provides some reference for enterprises and relevant regulatory authorities.
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